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THE PERSISTENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEW YORK 
CITY CONSTRUCTION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
CASEY ICHNIOWSKI and ANNE PRESTON* 
This study explores the strengths and weaknesses of economic reason- 
ing in explaining, and suggesting remedies for, the stubborn presence of 
racketeering inNew York City construction. In this industry, the authors 
argue, transactions cannot be conducted efficiently either between a large 
number of firms or within a few large firms. Consequently, criminals can 
"sell," and profit from, their ability to impose organization on the industry. 
Criminal activity can persist because of barriers to entry in certain markets 
within the industry and because of industry characteristics such as constant 
changes of, and restricted access to, work sites. The role of unions as a 
monopolizing institution may also facilitate criminal control. These and 
other economic hypotheses are relevant o policy making, the authors 
maintain, even though they cannot be adequately tested with available 
data. 
In almost every branch of the many activities that enter into 
building construction we found ... combinations rampant and 
unchecked and competition completely throttled. The result 
was accomplished by all manner of devices, from the flagrant 
matching of bids and illegal combinations between employers 
and employee associations, to the surreptitious agency of the 
apparently innocuous Luncheon Club under cover of which 
production was regulated, territory apportioned and prices fixed 
between ostensible competitors. 
-Intermediate Report of the Lockwood Commission, 1922 
THE existence of widespread illegal activ- 
ity in the New York City construction 
industry has been recognized at least since 
the release of the Lockwood Commission's 
report in 1922. Despite periodic public out- 
* Casey Ichniowski is Associate Professor at the 
Columbia University Graduate School of Business, 
and Anne Preston is Assistant Professor at the W. 
Averell Harriman School for Management and 
Policy, SUNY at Stony Brook. They thank Tammy 
Feldman for comments on the paper and Maria Pilar 
Perez and Milton Assang for research assistance. 
They are indebted to the staff and consultants of the 
Organized Crime Task Force of the State of New 
York for insightful discussions. 
cries for more than sixty years, however, 
the pattern of corruption has persisted. The 
most recent public report on the problem is 
the Interim Report of the New York State 
Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF), "Cor- 
ruption and Racketeering in the New York 
City Construction Industry" (OCTF 1988).1 
' The OCTF is a New York state agency estab- 
lished in 1970 by New York Executive Law 70-a to 
investigate and prosecute multi-county organized 
criminal activity. On June 25, 1985, Governor Mario 
Cuomo requested the OCTF to investigate allega- 
tions of corruption in the New York City construc- 
tion industry. 
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One section of that report lists and de- 
scribes 31 separate court cases initiated since 
1980 that involve criminal charges and con- 
victions in construction in the New York met- 
ropolitan area. This list is not exhaustive. 
Rather, it selectively cites cases to illustrate 
the various distinctive forms of illegal activ- 
ity in this industry-among them, extor- 
tion, bribery, theft, fraudulent billing, pen- 
sion fund fraud, tax fraud, sabotage, bid 
rigging, and crimes of violence, including 
murder.2 
Several New York City construction 
unions have been involved in this illegal 
activity. The OCTF (1988:70-73) reports 
''criminal investigations that have revealed 
La Cosa Nostra control over or influence 
in" at least 13 construction locals in New 
York City. Corruption and illegal activity 
are by no means confined, however, to 
construction unions. The OCTF's Interim 
Report contains numerous examples of 
criminal activity by general contractors 
and specialty subcontractors, as well as by 
government officials. 
In this study, we examine the persistent 
pattern of crime in New York City construc- 
tion using the tools and perspective of eco- 
nomics. We attempt to identify fundamen- 
tal economic questions and issues relevant 
to this criminal activity, and we suggest how 
economic principles can, in theory, explain 
the observed patterns. Furthermore, we eval- 
uate how well the theoretical explanations 
can be tested with available data and de- 
scribe the kinds of additional data that would 
permit more thorough analysis. Our exam- 
ination shows that some insights can be 
gained from an economic approach to this 
difficult problem,3 but it also reveals limita- 
tions of that approach. 
2 Other investigations that have documented exten- 
sive illegal activity in New York City construction 
include investigative reports in the New York Times in 
1982 (Oreskes 1982a, 1982b; Raab 1982) and the 
"sting operation" of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion and the Organized Crime Strike Force for the 
Eastern District of New York, code-named LILREX 
(OCTF 1988: 10). 
3 An earlier version of this paper was prepared for 
the OCTF. Throughout, we rely on examples, cases, 
and investigative work reported by the OCTF in its 
Interim Report (1988). 
The Structure of the New York City 
Construction Industry 
CRIME FIGURE: Close the door, friend, we 
got a problem . .. you got to understand 
something, all right? This guy was being set 
up [to get a contract award], okay, by very, 
very heavy people, including myself, okay? 
The prices were all inflated okay? If you 
weren't in there, I want to tell you what kind 
of ball game you're in, okay? The lowest 
price . . . was a million dollars more than 
what you were asking for . . . 
CONTRACTOR: You're laughing because 
you're in a lot of hot water. 
CRIME FIGURE: I'm laughing because you're 
in a lot of hot water. 
-Intercepted conversation between 
crime figure and contractor (OCTF 
1988:83) 
Like the contractor in the conversation, 
an economist who is faced with explaining 
the persistence of criminal organization in 
New York City construction, and the 
barriers to entry encountered by employ- 
ers who refuse to participate in corruption 
activities in that industry, is in some hot 
water. An examination of the nature of 
construction activity can, however, pro- 
vide some explanations of why criminal 
organization has supplanted the rules of 
competitive markets in some parts of the 
industry. 
The construction process is a vertical 
chain of sequential transactions. As in any 
other industry, transactions may be con- 
ducted primarily between firms in a 
market or between agents or employees of 
a single firm. Markets involve many 
potential buyers, with terms of exchange 
given by market prices; economic activity 
conducted inside a firm involves fewer 
parties negotiating the terms of exchange 
(Coase 1937). The nature of an industry's 
transactions is an important determinant 
of whether production and exchange in 
that industry are organized primarily in 
the market or within the firm (see espe- 
cially Williamson 1975:8-10). In the con- 
struction industry, however, there are 
barriers both to the formation of large, 
vertically integrated firms and to the 
formation of efficient markets. These 
barriers create an opportunity for orga- 
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nized crime to coordinate economic activ- 
ity in parts of the industry. 
Barriers to Market Formation 
Three basic characteristics of construc- 
tion transactions and production make it 
costly and inefficient o conduct economic 
activity through markets with many rela- 
tively small firms. Instead, these factors 
encourage the development of a vertically 
integrated construction process within each 
firm. 
First, the production process involves a 
series of sequential transactions. Extensive 
coordination is needed to avoid delays, 
which can be quite costly in this industry. 
Idle inputs are one major component of 
the costs of delay. Furthermore, because 
large construction projects are commonly 
financed with multi-million-dollar loans, 
one extra day of delay causes thousands of 
dollars of interest charges. As the number 
of firms in a given stage of production 
increases, costs and uncertainty in coordi- 
nating a construction project will also 
increase. 
Second, the sequential nature of the 
production process, coupled with its inher- 
ent complexity, makes construction mar- 
kets susceptible to "moral hazard." Moral 
hazard occurs when a participant in a 
transaction behaves opportunistically after 
the contract is implemented. In construc- 
tion, the costs of production and the 
quality of the product at any stage depend 
on the quality of work in previous stages. 
Because it is costly for one firm to monitor 
the work of another, and difficult for 
someone with one specialty to evaluate the 
quality of output of workers with many 
different specialties, opportunistic subcon- 
tractors may not deliver promised quality 
to the developer or to the contractor in the 
next stage of the construction process. 
Internal organization of transactions can 
reduce the occurrence of such opportunis- 
tic behavior by instituting a monitoring 
process and internalizing the costs of poor 
workmanship across stages of production 
within a single firm. 
Third, capital and human assets re- 
quired in many phases of construction are 
highly specialized. Construction workers 
often invest in very specialized training. 
Much of the capital equipment used in 
construction is designed for specific tasks, 
with limited value in alternative uses. As 
resources become more specialized and 
their versatility decreases, the number of 
potential buyers and sellers for any trans- 
action becomes smaller and the market- 
determined terms of exchange less well 
defined. In addition, contracts negotiated 
through markets cannot anticipate all 
possible contingencies. Unforeseen events 
may cause contracts to be renegotiated or 
possibly even cancelled. If parties void the 
initial transaction, both the owners and 
employers of expensive specialized assets 
incur considerable costs as those assets lie 
idle and complex production processes are 
delayed. In such cases, internal organiza- 
tion of transactions in firms allows for 
more flexible and adaptable contracts, and 
thus becomes a more efficient means of 
production (Williamson 1981:1548-49). 
Barriers to Large Firms 
Although there are forces discouraging 
external market organization of transac- 
tions in the construction industry, there 
are also forces discouraging firms from 
internalizing transactions. A firm is lim- 
ited in how far it can grow and how many 
transactions it can subsume. 
First, due to the long duration of a 
single construction project and the many 
processes involved in it, a developer- 
contractor who is integrated vertically 
across all stages of production cannot 
guarantee full-time work for each type of 
worker and continual use of all specialized 
equipment. Thus, costs of idle resources 
could be even higher after vertical integra- 
tion than they are when separate firms 
conduct transactions. 
Second, construction activity is highly 
cyclical, and firms face high risks of 
bankruptcy during economic downturns. 
Because of the specialization of capital 
assets and limits on resale of equipment, 
exit from this industry is more costly than 
it is from many other industries. A 
vertically integrated construction firm 
would likely suffer much higher losses 
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than other construction firms during 
downturns. 
Third, antitrust regulation places direct 
legal limits on the extent to which firms 
can expand vertically or horizontally. 
Although expansion may reduce many 
transaction costs, the accumulation of 
market share is visible and potentially 
illegal. In addition, in public construction 
projects in New York City, the Wicks Law 
prohibits officials from letting construc- 
tion contracts to a single contractor for all 
construction tasks.4 This regulation makes 
a legal combination between a general and 
a subordinate contractor impractical. 
Opportunities for Crime 
There are considerable economic and 
legal barriers to both the formation of 
markets and the growth of vertically 
integrated firms in the construction indus- 
try. The high potential profits in the 
industry, however, are a strong incentive 
for forming some system to organize 
economic activity. Since New York City is 
an international center for trade and 
commerce, it is reasonable to assume that 
the demand for office and housing space 
is both high and relatively inelastic. At the 
same time, there are geographic limits on 
space and technological limits on high-rise 
construction, so expansion of the supply 
of space is costly and limited. The price of 
space is therefore high and probably well 
above unit input costs of construction net 
of the costs of coordinating and executing 
transactions. 
In the absence of another alternative for 
4 The Wicks Law, which was enacted in the 1930s, 
applies to all public construction projects in New 
York State with anticipated costs over $50,000. The 
law requires government agencies to select separate 
contractors for each of four categories of work: 
plumbing and gas fitting; electrical; heating, ventila- 
tion, and air conditioning; and remaining work. The 
legal interpretation of the law has required that the 
government agency letting the construction contract 
supervise and coordinate the separate contracts. The 
law was designed to protect the public from collusive 
practices of general contractors. In practice, how- 
ever, most industry participants feel that the law 
promotes inefficiency and makes the industry more 
susceptible to racketeering (OCTF 1988:108-10). 
coordinating and executing economic trans- 
actions across the sequential stages of 
production, firms would grow to the limits 
imposed by diseconomies of internaliz- 
ing transactions and by legal regulations. 
Markets would mediate transactions across 
firms despite the costs of this form of 
economic organization if market prices 
were sufficient to cover these costs. The 
potential profits in construction have, 
however, attracted a third organizing 
structure to the industry-organized crime. 
Like the legal firm, organized crime is a 
"governance structure" for internalizing 
transactions where markets are a costly 
method for conducting exchange (Schell- 
ing 1967). Criminal law obviously prohib- 
its activities uch as extortion, bribery, and 
theft, which too often characterize New 
York City construction. The record leaves 
no doubt, however, that legal deterrents 
have not been completely effective. A 
probable reason for this record is that the 
cost of enforcing criminal law is higher in 
construction than in other industries. One 
factor that may make law enforcement 
efforts especially costly is the mobility of 
resources and work locations in construc- 
tion, where a work site exists only for the 
length of a given project. Such mobility 
seems to be an important characteristic of 
other industries that are plagued by crime. 
For example, Taft (1958:34) identified 
"trucking, sections of the amusement 
industry, and distributive trades and ser- 
vices," in addition to the building trades, 
as industries in which racketeering has 
persisted over long periods. 
Further hampering law enforcement 
efforts is the restricted access to construc- 
tion work sites that is legally required as a 
safety precaution. Outsiders who venture 
onto a work site are conspicuous, and 
contracting firms and their employees can 
often detect and evade those who try to 
police transactions. Similarly, if barriers to 
the formation of markets have kept the 
number of firms small, organized crime 
needs to monitor and control fewer 
economic agents. 
These characteristics of construction 
that make the detection of illegal activity 
relatively difficult reduce the costs and 
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risks of crime. The "supply" of criminal 
activity will therefore be correspondingly 
high. 
Demand for the alternative governance 
structure provided by organized crime 
arises because there are valued services 
that firms cannot provide legally without 
significant costs. The services that orga- 
nized crime can promise to provide or 
threaten to withhold include coordinating 
activity across stages of a construction 
project, monitoring opportunistic behav- 
ior, and rationing business to "member" 
firms during downturns.5 
The organization of economic activity in 
this industry through criminal means is 
therefore partly a response to the barriers 
to the growth of legal firms and partly a 
response to the high cost of detection of 
criminal activity. There is also a third 
principal economic motivation for illegal 
activity in construction. Government regu- 
lation of urban construction activity is 
considerable. These regulations are at- 
tempts to reduce external costs imposed 
on uninvolved individuals due to de- 
creased access to streets, light, and other 
amenities and increased probabilities of 
construction-related accidents. As pointed 
out in "The Report of the Mayor's Blue 
Ribbon Panel on Building Plan Examina- 
tion and Review" (Shinn et al. 1986), 
permits are required in New York City at 
virtually all stages of the construction 
process to obtain approval of the place- 
ment of equipment in streets; the closing 
of sidewalks; the operation of heavy 
equipment; the ways in which a new 
building will change the pattern of sun- 
light; and any effects on historic sites. 
Obtaining permits and site inspections 
prior to a construction project is itself a 
multi-year process, according to the Shinn 
Report. Furthermore, building inspectors 
5 Although organized crime's control of the 
construction process may reduce transaction costs 
through improved coordination of operations, it 
does not necessarily decrease total costs of construc- 
tion. Beneficiaries of the coordination pay extortion 
fees. The difference between the extortion fee and 
the value of the improved coordination determines 
the effect of organized crime on costs of construc- 
tion. 
must approve the quality of workmanship 
at each stage of production. 
Any regulations that raise private costs 
to contractors to minimize the social costs 
of construction create further opportuni- 
ties for someone to profit from illegal 
behavior. For example, in 1986, the 
Brooklyn manager of electrical inspections 
was convicted of taking bribes from 
electrical contractors to speed up paper- 
work and overlook code violations. Such 
bribes are not rare: during a three-month 
undercover investigation in 1985, a city 
building inspector was offered bribes in 
return for favors by 28 owners and 
contractors (OCTF 1988: 22).6 Generally, 
if the purpose of such bribes is to secure 
the approval of relatively shoddy construc- 
tion, consumers of the office or housing 
space, or even uninvolved third parties, 
will bear the costs of repairs and material 
failure and any added risks of unsafe 
construction. In short, regulations that 
shift external costs to private contractors 
provide contractors with an incentive to 
bribe those administering the regulations. 
Specific Sources of Monopoly Power 
Construction in the New York City 
SMSA involved 12,304 business establish- 
ments in 1982 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1982a:20), a figure apparently supporting 
the usual characterization of construction 
as a highly competitive industry. Because 
construction requires the production of a 
great variety of intermediate goods in its 
sequential production process, however, 
these thousands of firms are not all 
competing with one another. To the 
economist, therefore, construction is a 
maze of subindustries. To analyze the 
6 There are many other regulations that create 
these kinds of opportunities for bribery. Regulations 
that restrict the weight of concrete mixing trucks 
below a truck's full load give drivers the opportunity 
to ignore the regulation for a fee. These bribes may 
speed up the construction process and minimize 
costly delays, but they do not necessarily improve 
efficiency. If full trucks damage Manhattan streets, 
bribes to overlook these regulations increase the costs 
of road repairs and the probability of motor vehicle 
accidents. 
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specific sources of monopoly power in 
construction, the three general principles 
discussed above-barriers to markets across 
stages of construction, barriers to vertical 
integration by firms, and opportunities for 
criminal organization of economic activity- 
must be borne in mind when examining 
each stage and each intermediate good 
involved in the construction process. 
The forces that impose barriers to the 
formation of efficient markets, impede 
vertical integration by firms, or reduce the 
costs of criminal organization naturally 
vary across specific subindustries of con- 
struction activity. Therefore, some subin- 
dustries are more susceptible to crime 
than others. All subindustries that are 
criminally controlled must, however, dis- 
play some signs of market power. Market 
power implies the barriers to entry that 
inhibit markets, that create and protect 
monopoly rents, and that keep the num- 
ber of firms small and monitoring and 
enforcement costs low. An exploration of 
the specific sources of monopoly power 
helps in understanding the locus and 
nature of criminal activity in the industry. 
First, some forces that keep the number 
of firms small and the size of firms large in 
certain subindustries of construction occur 
naturally. Regional markets in which as- 
sets are immobile, and the minimum 
efficient scale of operations is large rela- 
tive to demand within the region, will have 
a relatively small number of firms. In 
addition, in subindustries where assets are 
highly specialized and industry exit is 
costly, the cyclicality of the market may 
encourage a relatively monopolistic indus- 
try structure. In such subindustries, mo- 
nopoly profits during upturns will be used 
to sustain the firm during downturns. 
Therefore, regional markets in these 
subindustries will have monopolistic ten- 
dencies. 
For example, according to unpublished 
information on construction contractors 
provided by the Anti-Trust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, the Anti- 
Trust Division initiated criminal prosecu- 
tions in 22 cases of bid-rigging involving 
utility construction contractors in 6 states 
between 1982 and 1987; 70 cases in 12 
states and the District of Columbia involv- 
ing electrical contractors between 1983 
and 1987; and 337 cases in 23 states 
involving road construction contractors 
between 1979 and 1987. These three 
subindustries therefore may have natural 
monopolistic tendencies. 
Government regulations that attempt to 
remedy the problems of externalities are a 
second source of monopoly power. For 
example, to ensure safety in underground 
work, New York City sewer installation 
and repair companies have the exclusive 
legal right to work in the holes they have 
opened. This unusual form of monopoly 
power gives the sewer company sole 
authority to move utility lines that are in 
the way of operations. As a result, the 
sewer companies could charge utility com- 
panies monopoly prices for these services. 
A third and obviously important source 
of monopoly power is the threat of harm 
and sabotage, which elevates entry barri- 
ers beyond natural levels. Such threats are 
probably not effective at creating entry 
barriers where none exist; in healthy 
competitive markets, violent threats to all 
competing firms are not credible because 
of the magnitude of the activity threat- 
ened. In cases where entry barriers natu- 
rally keep the number of competing firms 
small, however, threats may elevate exist- 
ing entry barriers, since they become more 
credible when directed at a small number 
of firms. Finally, another important tool 
that organized crime has found to control 
firms and markets is the labor union. 
The Labor Union as a Source of 
Market Control 
Now, as the [Employers'] Association, we 
control the [employers]. When we control the 
men we control the [employers] even better 
because they're ven more fuckin' afraid. Do 
you understand me? When you got an [em- 
ployer] who steps out of line, you got the whip. 
You got the fuckin' whip. This is what he [one 
of the crime bosses] tells me all the time. 
-Intercepted conversation of crime fig- 
ure (OCTF 1988:79) 
The labor union is an effective tool of 
control because it is a monopolizing 
institution that can control critical labor 
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resources in all phases of a construction 
project. Not all labor unions in New York 
City construction are corrupt, of course. 
In some unions the leadership and mem- 
bers are free of any taint, and in other 
cases there are efforts by members to 
reform their own unions internally. Orga- 
nized crime unquestionably controls unions 
in some subindustries of New York City 
construction, however; and supplanting 
entrenched corrupt unions with new 
"clean" ones is difficult. For example, the 
efforts of apparently honest men to gain 
positions of leadership in New York 
carpenters' union locals have repeatedly 
been thwarted. As a dramatic example, 
after a life-threatening campaign in 1975, 
Willie Nordstrom, who appears to have 
been free of criminal connections, was 
voted in as business manager for Carpen- 
ters Local 488 in the Bronx-and in 1978 
he was murdered (OCTF 1988:33-34). 
The corrupt labor union can use threats 
of sabotage and work stoppages to extort 
payments from employers and to disci- 
pline firms that do not play by the 
criminals' rules: 
But we gotta have the strength so that when a 
fucker comes along and bids [on a contract 
which is supposed to be limited to members of 
a Cosa Nostra Family-sponsored cartel] tomor- 
row he's got four Gold Tooths7 in front of him 
saying "Now that [you've got the contract] 
where are all the workers?" (Intercepted 
Conversation of Crime Figure, OCTF 1988:79) 
Extortion payments are commonly paid to 
ensure uninterrupted work. In a recent 
civil suit against Local 6A of the Cement 
and Concrete Workers, organized crime 
figures are alleged to have extorted one 
percent of the contract price from all 
ready-mix concrete contractors in return 
for labor peace (OCTF 1988:19). 
Union members can also destroy work 
of contractors whose actions are diminish- 
ing the market power of the criminal 
organization. For example, in 1971, offi- 
cials of Local 1087 of the Painters were 
convicted of using acid to destroy the 
7 Gold Tooth: nickname of a Lucchese-controlled 
union delegate. 
windows of contractors who used non- 
union workers to install window glass. 
Alternatively, a corrupt union official 
can extract rents from employers in 
return for "privileges." For example, a 
union official may allow a contractor, for a 
price, to hire specific workers with a 
proven track record rather than adhering 
strictly to contractual hiring hall provi- 
sions. In some instances corrupt union 
officials may even grant the contractor 
permission to use nonunion labor, but this 
privilege also has a price. A business agent 
of Local 608 of the Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners is currently being 
prosecuted for allegedly demanding pay- 
offs from undercover agents posing as 
representatives of a building owner in 
return for the owner's use of nonunion 
carpenters (OCTF 1988:17). 
Similarly, corrupt union officials may 
accept bribes for not enforcing other 
costly provisions of the labor contract. For 
example, the LILREX "sting operation" 
initiated in 1976 by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Organized Crime 
Strike Force for the Eastern District of 
New York uncovered a practice by some 
contractors of paying certain workers the 
union hourly rate but not listing them on 
employment records. This practice saved 
the employers the cost of the pension and 
welfare contributions that were required 
by the union contract. The workers did 
not object because the contractors certified 
them as eligible for unemployment insur- 
ance (OCTF 1988:28). 
A Corrupt Union and the 
Distribution of Rents Among 
Contractor, Employee, and 
Criminal Actor 
Once the criminal organization has 
monopoly power at some point in the 
construction process, it will try to appro- 
priate economic rents. The redistribution 
of economic rents from developers, con- 
tractors, and employees to the criminal 
organizer depends on the market forces 
governing the particular transactions and 
the strategy of the criminal organizer. 
Because there is no long-standing rela- 
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Figure 1. The Surplus Accruing to Employers, 
Labor, and the Union in Different Market Situations. 
Wages . n MFC* Wagesin 
wwm~~~~s || | \ W~~~~~mn Suppl*y X 
WC~~~~~~~~~~~~w 
Lms Lc Labor Employed Lmn Lc Labor Employed 
(la) (lb) 
* MFC and MRP are the marginal factor cost curve and the marginal revenue cost curve, respectively. 
tionship between the firm and most 
employees in this industry, construction 
unions are often in the unusual position of 
allocating both jobs to workers and work- 
ers to employers-a position that offers 
the corrupt union official the opportunity 
to exploit both parties to the employment 
transaction. The extent of exploitation 
that can occur will vary across subindus- 
tries, however, depending on the union's 
power in each case. 
The corrupt union official presumably 
seeks the strategy that maximizes the 
potential rents available for extortion. 
Consider first the extreme case in which 
the union acts as both monopsonist (allo- 
cating all jobs to all workers) and monop- 
olist (allocating all workers to all employ- 
ers). In that case, the union official, when 
faced with the demand and supply curves 
displayed in Figure la, will choose the 
monopsonist wage and employment levels, 
Was and Lms both of which are lower than 
the corresponding competitive levels, W, 
and L. This strategy maximizes the 
employer surplus (the shaded area in 
Figure la). 
The corrupt union official will then 
charge the employer a fee equal to some 
portion of the employer's surplus to 
ensure delivery of the labor services. 
Although the sum of wage payments and 
employer surplus equals the value of labor 
employed, extortion of the full surplus 
might well reduce the contractors' profits 
below minimum levels necessary for mar- 
ket survival. If the employer does not pay, 
the union official has the power to impose 
delays or work stoppages and to organize 
sabotage of the construction process.8 
It is highly unlikely, however, that any 
union has the absolute power portrayed in 
Figure la, particularly in a labor market 
such as New York City, where workers 
have the opportunity to work in many 
different industries and occupations. More 
likely, the corrupt union official will be 
forced to negotiate at least a competitive 
wage to attract workers. In this case the 
strategy that maximizes the potential ex- 
tortion fee is to negotiate the competitive 
wage and employment levels, W, and L, 
of Figure lb, and extort some portion of 
the employer surplus given by the shaded 
triangle. 
Perhaps most likely, even corrupt union 
officials in an urban labor market will 
8 An extortion fee equal to the employer surplus 
in the labor market transaction is similar to the 
introduction of a two-part tariff in the product 
market. This tariff or fee in a product market 
transaction transfers some or all of the consumer 
surplus from consumer to monopolist. Oi (1975) 
used the example of Disneyland to illustrate how the 
monopolist benefits from charging an admission fee 
as well as unit prices for each service consumed. 
The labor market and product market cases are 
not, however, entirely analogous. The employer's 
surplus in the labor market transaction does not 
correspond directly to profits. For example, in the 
short run, if labor is the only variable factor, the 
employer surplus in the labor market transaction 
must be used to pay for fixed costs. Therefore, as 
noted in the text, a strategy that extorts the full 
employer surplus in this case will be self-defeating, 
resulting in negative profits in the short run and 
driving the firm out of the industry in the long run. 
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usually find that they must negotiate a 
contract wage equal to some monopoly 
wage rate (Wrnn). Although construction 
unions enjoy the advantages of exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain production tasks, 
different unions with their own exclusive 
jurisdictions often employ workers with 
similar skills. If an honest union and a 
corrupt union representing workers with 
similar skills negotiate separate labor con- 
tracts, the agreement of the honest union 
may constrain the strategy of the corrupt 
union. Even in undemocratic unions, that 
is, membership dissatisfaction can impose 
some pressures on union officials. 
Therefore, negotiations between cor- 
rupt unions and employers may result in 
the monopoly wages, Wrnn, shown in 
Figure lb. In this case the maximum fee 
the corrupt union official can extort from 
the employer, in return for delivery of 
employment services, is the employer 
surplus associated with monopoly wages 
(the checkered area in Figure lb). Again, 
this fee may be further constrained since it 
must remain below the level that would 
drive contractors out of the industry and 
deprive crime bosses of their income. 
Under this third scenario, the existence of 
organized crime in a union may not yield 
contract wage payments lower than those 
negotiated by honest unions, but it still 
transfers ome profits from the developer- 
contractor to the corrupt union officials. 
The three preceding scenarios show 
that wages and extortion fees will depend 
on the level of monopsonistic control of 
the corrupt union official. Other things 
equal, the more monopsonistic the power 
of the union, the lower the wages paid to 
union workers and the higher the poten- 
tial extortion fee for the union official. 
Extortion fees can persist, however, only if 
they are financed by monopoly profits in 
the product market or if contractors can 
pass on increases in labor costs in the form 
of higher prices. Because it may be more 
profitable for the corrupt unions to 
bargain with employers who can extract 
monopoly profits by exerting market 
power of their own, a corrupt labor union 
may employ strategies that extend its 
monopoly power into the employing firms' 
market.9 For example, labor unions could 
withhold services from certain contractors 
while colluding with others to reduce the 
number of contractors in the market. If 
the contractor market can be made more 
monopolistic, potential extortion fees will 
be greater. 
The preceding analysis makes no refer- 
ence to the effect of criminal control of 
the union on unreported or "under- 
the-table" wages. When the strategies 
described above are employed, workers 
either are unaware of the illegal activity 
between the corrupt official of their union 
and the contractor or experience no 
disutility from working in a corrupt 
organization. More likely, at least some 
workers will be aware of any illegal activity 
and will demand extra compensation in 
return for the disutility of working in such 
a union. A corrupt union official faced 
with worker demands for extra compensa- 
tion-bribes-in return for ignoring ille- 
gal activity can respond by increasing 
either the workers' reported earnings or 
their unreported earnings. 
If employees do require bribes, the 
labor supply curve that includes these 
bribes (Sb in Figure 2) will be above the 
original labor supply curve that does not 
incorporate bribes (Snb). The union offi- 
cial, deciding whether or not to engage in 
illegal activity, must recognize that his 
illegal activity can shift the supply curve in 
this manner. 
Under the Sb supply curve, the union 
9 There need not necessarily be monopoly power 
in the product market in order for a corrupt union 
official to practice extortion. The union can charge 
extortion fees to firms in a perfectly competitive 
product market if the product market demand curve 
is downward sloping and the union extorts from all 
of the competing firms. In this case the extortion fee 
is a fixed cost that all firms must pay. Prices rise in 
the product market to cover the increased average 
costs, and total output falls. 
The transaction costs associated with extortion 
probably increase dramatically, however, as the 
number of firms paying extortion fees increases. 
Therefore, the transaction costs involved in charging 
an extortion fee to all firms in a competitive market 
are probably so high that such a strategy would not 
be profitable. These costs are another incentive for 
the corrupt union official to try to reduce the 
number of contractors in the product market. 
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Figure 2. Bribes to Workers and the Labor 
Supply Curve. 
official has two strategies. First, he can 
simply take the Sb curve into account, 
when negotiating a wage, instead of the 
Snb curve. For example, if the union 
official were negotiating a competitive 
wage, he would negotiate Wb instead of 
W,. However, the increase in the negoti- 
ated wage above W, reduces the available 
extortion fee. 
Alternatively, the corrupt union official 
can negotiate wages according to the 
original Snb curve and then use the 
extortion fee to bribe workers only when 
necessary. The union official engages in 
this alternative strategy only if he can 
offer separate bribes to each worker. For 
example, if the union official negotiates 
Wc, the competitive wage associated with 
the Snb curve, those workers between Lo 
and L1 on the Sb curve in Figure 2 will not 
demand a bribe. W, is sufficient to cover 
the "bribe" these workers require before 
they agree to work in this market. Work- 
ers on the Sb curve between L1 and L, 
however, will demand a bribe in excess of 
W,. If the union official can offer separate 
bribes to each worker, the value of the 
bribes will be equal to the shaded area in 
Figure 2. 
Separate bribes negotiated between indi- 
vidual workers and their union official are 
plausible since the illegality of the bribe 
prevents workers from making their "un- 
der-the-table" payment known to other 
workers. This alternative strategy will be 
chosen by the union official if the result- 
ing extortion fee, surplus less bribes, is 
larger than the extortion fee associated 
with the strategy of negotiating the higher 
wage, Wb.'0 In general, the extortion fee 
associated with the strategy of selective 
bribery will be larger the smaller the 
number of workers demanding a bribe in 
excess of the competitive wage and the 
lower the average bribe payment." 
Unreported earnings or bribe payments 
may come in a variety of forms. The union 
official may personally make cash trans- 
fers to union members, or he may give 
these workers "no show" jobs or shifts in 
which paid hours are greater than hours 
worked. 
Testing the Economic Hypotheses 
We have hypothesized that some fea- 
tures of construction activity make certain 
subindustries of construction particularly 
susceptible to crime. We have also sug- 
gested ways in which market forces con- 
strain the attempts of organized crime to 
profit from sources of market power. 
Unfortunately, the available data do not 
permit a rigorous test of those hypotheses. 
In this section we review published statis- 
tics on product market and labor market 
characteristics in the construction markets 
of the New York City SMSA and other 
large SMSAs, and consider to what extent 
these data support the theoretical proposi- 
tions of the previous sections. Since the 
data consistently leave many, if not most, 
important issues unresolved, we also dis- 
10 Depending on the placement and shape of the 
relevant demand and supply curves, the rent- 
maximizing strategy may also take some intermediate 
form in which negotiated wages are between Wb and 
W, and some bribe payments exist. 
1 l If the union official negotiates a monopoly wage 
according to Sb, the union premium may already 
cover the bribe required by the marginal worker. 
Therefore, corrupt activities will not affect the 
negotiated wage. If, however, the union wage 
premium leaves earned wages below levels that 
would compensate the marginal worker for working 
in a corrupt union, the union official will again have 
to decide between two strategies. He will either 
negotiate a higher wage that covers the bribe 
demanded by the marginal worker or keep wages at 
monopoly levels and bribe only those workers who 
demand further compensation for working with 
corrupt unions. A comparison of the resulting 
extortion fees will guide his decision. 
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cuss what kinds of data would permit 
more thorough analysis. 
Product Market Comparisons 
Above, we argued that market power is 
a necessary attribute of any criminally 
controlled subindustry in construction. If 
that argument is correct, an examination 
of the size distribution of firms in the 
various subindustries across cities should 
give some indication of which construction 
processes may be controlled more easily by 
organized crime. These statistics should 
also suggest whether the locus of monop- 
oly control in New York City differs from 
that in other cities. Unfortunately, de- 
tailed information on the size distribution 
of firms at the municipal level is not 
available. The only relevant published 
information is average firm size, not the 
size distribution around the average. Spe- 
cifically, the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1982b) reports number of establishments 
and receipts-per-establishment by SMSA 
for 27 detailed construction subindustries. 
These data yield a measure of average 
firm size in each SMSA for each detailed 
industry, as measured by receipts- 
per-establishment expressed in New York 
City dollars.'2 This statistic is at best a very 
crude proxy of market power. 
An examination of these data reveals 
that in eight of the 27 industry groups, the 
average firm size in the New York City 
SMSA exceeds the average firm size across 
the next ten largest SMSAs, across the 26 
Northeastern SMSAs reported by the 
Census of Construction Industries (CCI), 
and across all 86 SMSAs reported by CCI. 
Specifically, relative to the average ad- 
justed receipts-per-establishment figure 
for the next ten largest SMSAs, the 
average New York City contractor receives 
revenues that are 27.6% greater in indus- 
try 1542-nonresidential buildings other 
than industrial buildings and warehouses; 
358.8% greater in industry 1622-heavy 
12 The Dodge Digest of Building Costs and Specifica- 
tions (1983) gives a cost index for 184 cities in the 
United States and Canada. These cost data were used 
to convert all receipt figures to New York City 
dollars. 
construction other than highways, bridges, 
tunnels, and elevated highways; 8.3% 
greater in industry 1623-water, sewer, 
and utility lines; 22.1% greater in industry 
1721 -painting and paper hanging subcon- 
tractors; 27.1 % greater in industry 1741- 
masonry and plastering; 73.5% greater in 
industry 1742-plastering, drywall, and 
insulation; 37.4% greater in industry 
1771-concrete; and 82.2% greater in 
industry 1796-special trade contractors 
for installation of miscellaneous building 
equipment. 
The OCTF (1988) reports many exam- 
ples of criminal activity in most of those 
eight subindustries in which New York 
City firms are, on average, relatively large. 
The detail of the criminal schemes de- 
scribed by OCTF suggests, however, the 
inadequacy of examining firm size as a 
signal of criminal activity. Statistics that 
describe the dispersion of firm sizes more 
completely, such as four- or eight-firm 
concentration ratios, would be much more 
likely to reflect these schemes than would 
average firm size. 
For example, in 1985, federal prosecu- 
tors proved that a "Club" of contractors 
in the concrete industry, one of the eight 
industries with relatively large firms in 
New York City, controlled any concrete 
contract with a value over two million 
dollars. Non-club contractors who at- 
tempted to serve this market were threat- 
ened with physical harm and problems 
with supplies and labor (OCTF 1988: 
82-84). The CCI reports that in 1982 
receipts in the New York City SMSA 
concrete market were $347 million (Bu- 
reau of the Census 1982b, Table 12, 
NY- 18), suggesting there was enough 
business in this subindustry to attract 
many firms other than the club members, 
and thus create the need for the few club 
members to "discipline" those not in the 
club. If the "Club" in New York City did 
exert more monopoly power than the 
large concrete firms in other cities, how- 
ever, detailed concentration ratios across 
cities would reflect the Concrete Club's 
arrangements more directly than would 
average firm size. 
Although the problems of measuring 
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monopoly power are considerable, they 
are relatively minor compared to the task 
of measuring criminal activity. Even if 
proxies for criminal activity, such as the 
amount of resources devoted to criminal 
prosecution in a specific industry, existed, 
such proxies would be of little use. 
Criminal activity may be most prevalent 
where it is least documented. If crime is 
particularly profitable, criminals may take 
the strongest precautions to keep their 
activity concealed. 
Labor Market Comparisons 
We have argued that construction unions 
can be an important source of monopoly 
power. According to merged data for the 
12 monthly Census of Population Surveys 
(CPS) for 1984 presented in Table 1, this 
potential source of monopoly power is 
particularly pronounced in New York 
City. 55.5% of all construction workers in 
the New York City SMSA are union 
members, and 63.3% are covered by a 
labor contract. The extent of unionization 
in the New York City SMSA is about twice 
that across the next ten largest U.S. 
SMSAs or across all U.S. SMSAs. In fact, 
the New York City SMSA has the highest 
unionization rates of all U.S. SMSAs. It is 
also reasonable to assume that within New 
York City itself, the percentage of construc- 
tion workers who are members of a union 
or who are covered by a collective bargain- 
ing contract is considerably higher than in 
the entire New York City SMSA. 
The 1984 CPS data allow a comparison 
of reported wages between union and 
nonunion workers in different metropoli- 
tan areas. The theoretical arguments we 
have outlined suggest that a corrupt union 
official has an incentive to keep legal 
wages as low as possible. Empirical esti- 
mates from wage regressions can provide 
limited tests of whether union officials in 
New York City have kept union wages 
relatively low compared to union wages in 
other metropolitan areas. 
The following reduced-form wage equa- 
tion for construction workers is estimated: 
(1) ln(Wj) = a + bX + bNyc(NYC) + e 
X contains a set of variables affecting the 
supply or demand of construction labor. 
NYC iS a dummy variable for construction 
workers in the New York City SMSA. 
The demand for construction workers 
underlying this reduced-form equation is 
a function of the skill level, education, and 
experience of workers. The supply of 
workers to the regional industry will be 
affected by wages in labor markets compet- 
ing for workers with similar skills. In 
addition to determinants of the supply of 
and demand for construction workers, 
wages will also depend on institutional 
forces, most notably unionism, that affect 
the operation of the construction labor 
markets. 
Estimating the reduced-form con- 
struction industry wage equation yields 
the parameters in column 1 of Table 
2. Since the alternative wage variables 
that measure difference in the cost of 
living are SMSA-level variables, the 
Table 1. Extent of Unionization of Construction Workers in New York City 
and Other SMSAs, 1984. 
Next J0 All SMSAs All U.S. 
N.Y. City Largest Other Other 
Data Description SMSA SMSASa Than NYCb Than N.Y.C 
Observations 167 1,332 4,903 9,432 
1. Union Member 55.5% 28.7% 26.7% 23.8% 
2. Covered by Union Contract 63.3% 30.7% 28.3% 25.3% 
Source: 1984 Census of Population Survey data tapes-merged sample of all construction industry workers in 
twelve monthly files. All statistics are calculated using CPS sampling weights. a The ten largest SMSAs other than New York City in 1984 were: Los Angeles-Long Beach; Chicago; 
Philadelphia; Detroit; San Francisco-Oakland; Washington, D.C.; Boston; Nassau and Suffolk Counties; 
Pittsburgh; and St. Louis. 
b The CPS identifies 44 separate SMSAs in its 1984 data files. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Reported Hourly Wages of Metropolitan Construction Workers, 1984. 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
All Union All Union 
Construction Members Construction Members 
Workers Only Workers Only 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Experience .027*** .019*** .027*** .019*** 
(.002) (.004) (.002) (.004) 
Experience Squared -.00047*** -.00036*** -.00047*** -.0004*** 
(.00004) (.00004) (.00004) (.0001) 
Region: 
Northeast -.059*** -.147*** -.061** .137*** 
(.023) (.0.37) (.026) (.041) 
North Central -.027 -.025 -.030 - .012 
(.024) (.038) (.028) (.043) 
South - .026 - . 139*** - .027 - . 147*** 
(.027) (.049) (.027) (.051) 
Blue-Collar -. 182*** .086 - . 182*** .087 
(.023) (.053) (.023) (.053) 
Female - .364*** - .162* -.364*** -.161* 
(.028) (.085) (.028) (.086) 
Black - .178*** - .241 *** -.177*** - .241*** 
(.026) (.038) (.026) (.038) 
Married .133*** .144*** .133*** .144*** 
(.017) (.029) (.017) (.029) 
Alternative Wages: 
Craftsmen .561*** .758*** .638*** .837*** 
(.157) (.259) (.172) (.290) 
Manufacturing .269* -.166 .270* - .175 
(.148) (.253) (.148) (.254) 
Operatives - .216* - .213 - .250** - .232 
(.115) (.188) (.117) (.190) 
Union Member .347*** - .348*** 
(.017) (.018) 
Percent Union - - .0002 -.001 
(.0010) (.002) 
New York City .003 .015 .0002 .033 
(.038) (.051) (.0419) (.058) 
Observations 2,882 930 2,882 930 
R2 .402 .207 .402 .208 
* Significant at the .10 level; ** significant at the .05 level; significant at the .01 level (two-tailed tests). 
sample for analysis is restricted to those 
individuals who reside in one of the 44 
SMSAs indentified in the CPS data files. 
The results in column 1 reveal wage 
patterns in metropolitan construction la- 
bor markets that are similar in many 
respects to those observed in wage equa- 
tions estimated for broader ranges of 
industries. The returns to experience are 
positive, but the positive return declines 
with more experience. Better-educated 
workers are more highly paid. Negative 
wage differentials for women and blacks 
exist in U.S. construction labor markets. 
As expected, the wages paid to craftsmen 
in industries other than construction ap- 
pear to be the best measure of an 
alternative wage for construction industry 
workers. 
The coefficient on the union member 
variable in this 1984 construction industry 
sample is .347, indicating a somewhat 
larger cross-section estimate of the union/ 
nonunion wage differential than exists in 
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many other industries. According to the 
theoretical arguments advanced in this 
study, this relatively large union wage 
premium is inconsistent with pervasive 
corruption in construction unions nation- 
wide. Specifically, if construction unions 
throughout the country were dominated 
by corrupt union officials, the strategy for 
the corrupt union officials of keeping 
wages as low as possible would produce 
union wages comparable to nonunion 
wages. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on the 
New York City variable in line 10 is not 
significantly different from zero. There- 
fore, after controlling for the effects of 
regional and local area wage differentials, 
and occupational, demographic, and union- 
ization characteristics of workers, there is 
no significant pay differential associated 
with working in the New York City SMSA. 
When the wage regression is reestimated 
in column 2 for the sample of union 
workers, the coefficient on the New York 
City variable is again insignificant.'3 
This result could be interpreted as 
evidence against widespread corruption in 
New York City construction unions. That 
is, theory suggests that if New York City 
construction unions were dominated by 
corrupt union officials and unions in 
other metropolitan areas were not, union 
wages in New York City would be, other 
things equal, below union wages in other 
metropolitan areas. 
The insignificant coefficient on the New 
York City variable in the column 2 
equation for union workers could, how- 
ever, still be evidence of relatively low 
union wages for New York City workers. 
Since wages generally increase with the 
degree of unionization (Freeman and 
13 The patterns of wage determination revealed in 
Table 2 remain when alternative subsamples of 
workers are analyzed. If one is particularly con- 
cerned about illegal activity in certain craft unions, 
the analysis should focus on union construction 
workers. Wage equations similar to the column 1 and 
2 models in Table 2 were estimated for the sample of 
construction craft workers (that is, detailed occupa- 
tional category no. 34) and the sample of unionized 
construction craft workers. In neither case were the 
coefficients on the New York City SMSA variable 
significantly different from zero. 
Medoff 1981), and since the New York 
City SMSA is the most highly unionized 
SMSA in the country, the coefficient on 
the New York City dummy variable in the 
column 2 model should be both positive 
and significant. The insignificant New 
York City coefficient therefore could 
indicate downward pressure on wages by 
corrupt union officials. 
To explore this possibility more directly, 
the column 1 and 2 wage equations are 
reestimated after including the percentage 
of the SMSA construction labor market 
that is unionized as another possible 
determinant of construction workers' earn- 
ings. The column 3 specification includes 
all construction workers in the sample, 
whereas the column 4 specification keeps 
only union members in the sample. In the 
column 3 model, the coefficient on the 
percent union variable measures a pre- 
mium enjoyed by both union and non- 
union workers. It is also useful to measure 
the effect of the percent union variable on 
the earnings of union members exclusively 
(column 4) because percent organized has 
a larger effect on union wages than on 
nonunion wages (Freeman and Medoff 
1981:567). 
The results in columns 3 and 4 do not 
show construction wages increasing with 
percent organized. In neither the all 
worker sample nor the union worker 
sample is the coefficient on percent union 
significantly different from zero. 
Furthermore, this finding is not simply 
a result of the failure of New York City 
unions to use their potential labor market 
power to increase the wages of their 
members as much as they could have. 
Since New York City has the highest level 
of construction unionization of any SMSA, 
unusual wage-setting behavior by New 
York City construction unions may have a 
large impact on the estimated linear effect 
of percent organized on wages. Specifi- 
cally, there may be a significant positive 
relationship between percent organized 
and wages across the metropolitan mar- 
kets other than New York; but if New 
York City unions use their unusually great 
labor market power to keep wages well 
below the level that could be attained, the 
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inclusion of New York City construction 
workers in the sample could reduce the 
estimated percent organized coefficient. 
That possible effect, however, is not the 
reason for the insignificant coefficient on 
percent organized. In models not re- 
ported in the table, New York City 
workers are excluded from the samples 
for the columns 3 and 4 wage equations. 
In these models, the coefficients on the 
percent organized variable are again virtu- 
ally zero. Other things equal, greater labor 
market power, as measured by extent of 
unionization, did not increase wages or 
the size of the union wage premium for 
construction workers in any city in 1984. 
Taken together, the insignificant coeffi- 
cient on percent organized in all models 
and the insignificant coefficient on the 
New York City variable indicate that 
corruption among union officials in New 
York City is not so pervasive that it leads 
to relatively low wages for New York City 
construction workers. On the other hand, 
there is also no evidence that, other things 
equal, union wages are any higher in New 
York City than they are in other metropol- 
itan areas, despite the higher degree of 
unionization in New York City, thus 
refuting the hypothesis that corrupt union 
officials "buy off" their members with 
higher legal wages. 
Although there is no evidence that 
union wages in New York City construc- 
tion systematically differ from those in 
construction elsewhere, that finding by no 
means proves that criminal activity in New 
York City construction unions is no higher 
than in construction unions in other cities. 
In particular, although we suggested that 
corrupt union officials might negotiate a 
monopoly wage comparable to the wage 
negotiated by honest unions, we also 
pointed out that criminal activity results in 
extortion fees and, possibly, "under- 
the-table" bribe payments to a subset of 
workers. 
Attempts to empirically gauge differ- 
ences in unreported earnings or extortion 
fees face insurmountable data collection 
and measurement problems. One possibil- 
ity for future research would be a compar- 
ative study of labor costs of firms, rather 
than individuals, across regional construc- 
tion markets. Firm-level data may measure 
differences in legal and illegal payments to 
labor more accurately than individual- 
level data. The success of such a study 
depends, however, on whether extortion 
fees paid to union officials are reported as 
labor costs; and even if such fees are 
reported, it is not clear how they would be 
categorized. The analysis could, alterna- 
tively, focus on the difference in total costs 
of firms across regional construction mar- 
kets. However, that approach would not 
be without difficulties either, since ele- 
vated construction costs in a certain 
metropolitan area could indicate criminal 
schemes by corrupt firms or government 
officials rather than by corrupt union 
officials. In fact, the OCTF (1988:30) 
reports that the cases in which construc- 
tion contractors have inflated invoices and 
cost figures to reduce tax liability are "too 
numerous to catalogue." 
Conclusion 
Devising effective strategies to fight 
organized crime in New York City construc- 
tion will clearly require building more 
knowledge about the systematic forces that 
have made it such a long-standing feature 
of the industry. The economic principles 
and hypotheses that can be brought to 
bear in addressing this difficult problem 
remain largely untested and untestable 
without a greater knowledge base. Policy 
makers must, however, formulate reme- 
dies and evaluate alternatives using what- 
ever evidence and ideas are available. 
The economic principles and hypothe- 
ses suggested in this study, although 
inherently difficult o test, do raise a set of 
questions that should be considered in the 
dialogue on possible remedial strategies. 
In particular, this study suggests that 
proposed policy initiatives hould be eval- 
uated in terms of whether they improve 
the coordination and reliability of the 
construction process, thereby reducing the 
demand for criminal activity; raise the 
expected costs of illegal activity by increas- 
ing both the size of penalties and the 
probability of detection; increase competi- 
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tion and weaken monopoly control over 
specific markets and transactions; and 
make more efficient the regulations per- 
taining to the externalities of construction 
activity. 
Obviously, the odds are against any 
proposed new remedy succeeding where 
others have failed for many decades. One 
problem is that often a policy aimed at 
eliminating one criminal activity may do so 
only at the cost of opening the way to 
others. For example, remedies aimed at 
introducing more competitors into specific 
construction markets-such as measures 
to increase nonunion competition-will 
also, by their very nature, reduce the 
ability of construction contractors to coor- 
dinate activities and lead to an even less 
reliable construction process, increasing 
the demand for criminal organization. 
Similarly, expedited arbitration of labor 
disputes and work stoppages might reduce 
delays in the construction process. Orga- 
nized crime would have a strong incentive 
to gain control of the centralized decision- 
making institution thereby created, how- 
ever, since centralized processes tend to 
make criminal activity less costly. Further- 
more, if a system without arbitration has 
served organized crime well, the criminal 
organization might attempt to sabotage a 
newly installed arbitration system by clog- 
ging it with trivial and fabricated cases, 
which could make the system slow, costly, 
unresponsive, and possibly more time- 
consuming than the current approaches to 
labor disputes. 
Again, any strategy that increases com- 
petition in labor markets may make the 
labor allocation process more inefficient. 
Since there is no long-standing employ- 
ment relationship between most workers 
and firms in the construction process, the 
union plays a central role in the allocation 
of labor across firms. Part of the price of 
this service is greater union control over 
the employment transaction. Proposed 
alternatives that would replace or supple- 
ment union hiring halls with nonunion 
hiring methods, such as community hiring 
halls or employer-administered hiring pro- 
grams (OCTF 1988:101), have their own 
drawbacks. Employer-administered hiring 
programs would probably carry higher 
search and hiring costs; and if hiring 
decisions shifted to community hiring 
halls, organized crime would focus its 
resources on controlling that new institu- 
tional mechanism for allocating labor. 
Empirical studies that determine whether 
criminal control of construction is preva- 
lent in metropolitan areas other than New 
York City may be helpful in designing 
policy. In particular, many of the eco- 
nomic factors that might promote criminal 
organization of construction activity are 
not confined strictly to New York City. For 
example, the sequential nature of transac- 
tions and the specificity of assets in certain 
construction markets naturally lead to the 
formation of large firms with monopolistic 
control. If criminal activity in certain 
construction subindustries occurs in many 
metropolitan areas, policies should focus 
on these subindustries, and on the eco- 
nomic conditions that make them attrac- 
tive to organized crime. 
If, on the other hand, criminal activity 
in certain construction subindustries is 
specific to New York City, then the 
economic forces that promote criminal 
organization are those that are particularly 
pronounced in New York City. For exam- 
ple, the problems of coordinating construc- 
tion projects may be especially difficult in 
New York City because of the scarcity of 
space and the density of the residential 
and commercial population. For the same 
reasons, the regulations governing New 
York City construction may be more 
extensive and complex than those govern- 
ing construction in other cities. In this 
case, policies specific to New York that 
address these local economic and legal 
factors would be more appropriate. 
In summary, an analysis of organized 
crime that uses the tools and perspective of 
economists has certain strengths and weak- 
nesses. Theories of product markets, labor 
markets, and the organization of the firm 
identify economic forces that attract orga- 
nized crime. Since at least part of the mo- 
tivation for criminal control of New York 
City's construction industry is economic, this 
theoretical perspective is an important part 
of a comprehensive examination of the 
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causes, persistence, and effects of orga- 
nized crime. As is generally the case with 
theories concerning criminal control of in- 
dustry, however, the hypothesized relation- 
ships cannot be rigorously tested; they can 
only be supported with anecdotal informa- 
tion. Despite these inherent limitations, the 
theoretical considerations do raise funda- 
mental issues and questions that can help 
inform policy discussions. 
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